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REJOINDER TO HASKER 
Linda Zagzebski 
In "Zagzebski on Power Entailment" William Hasker responds to the three 
sets of counterexamples to Power Entailment Principles given in my book, 
The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. In this rejoinder I answer 
Hasker's objections to the first two examples, and agree with him that the third 
example is defective, although for a different reason than the one Hasker presents. 
In my book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, I present three 
types of counterexamples to the most well-known Power Entailment Princi-
ples. William Hasker has challenged all three, focusing on their application 
to (PEP 1). Such a principle is threatening to most attempts to show divine 
foreknowledge and human free will compatible according to which God is in 
time and backwards causation is impossible. Since I defend theological com-
patibilism for the case in which God is in time as well as for the case in which 
God is not in time, and since I do not attempt to defend backwards causation, 
it is important for me to challenge this principle. 
My first set of counterexamples is based on the idea that if any necessary 
truths and their negations can be brought about by anybody while others can 
be brought about by nobody, all of the proposed PEPs are false. As a sugges-
tion for a proposition in the first category I propose (11) If there is a Fall, 
God sends his Son to redeem the world. I suggest that (11) may be a necessary 
truth, yet one chosen to be a necessary truth by God. To this Hasker objects 
(1) that my example requires a non-standard view of modal logic, but I have 
not given reason to think there is anything wrong with the standard view, and 
(2) I operate within the standard theory for most of the book. In particular, I 
accept three principles according to which my own counterexample fails. I 
will respond to the first point first. 
This counterexample rests on the idea that there are alternative complete 
sets of possible worlds, so even though (11) is true in all possible worlds 
(we'll suppose), it is not true in worlds which would have been possible had 
there been a different set of possible worlds. This makes sense only if modal 
structure itself could have been different. It requires making a distinction 
within the class of the necessary between those propositions which are nec-
essarily necessary and those which are not necessarily necessary. As I remark 
in my book, this way of looking at modality requires a modal system weaker 
than S4 (p. 112). Without commenting on the relative merits of stronger and 
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weaker modal systems, Hasker says that in order for the view I propose to 
be taken seriously, I must (1) elaborate in detail an alternative modal theory, 
and (2) show that the standard theory is inconsistent or incoherent, and there-
fore the PEPs which presuppose this theory are inadmissible (p. 252). 
But the degree to which the rejection of S4 is non-standard is questionable. 
As noted in the book, Nathan Salmon and Hugh Chandler have both argued 
on independent grounds that S4 must be rejected anyway.) As Hasker knows, 
weaker modal systems exist, and there is no need for me to elaborate a new 
one in detail. Nevertheless, I proposed a brief metaphysical argument that S4 
must be rejected, which I will summarize. 
The Principle of Sufficient Reason is often interpreted in such a way that 
a reason is required for the truth value of a proposition, but not for its modal 
status. If some proposition is contingent, a reason is required for its truth, but 
if a proposition is necessary, the fact that it is necessary is sufficient reason 
for its being true. But why, we may ask, is some particular necessary propo-
sition necessary? What explains its necessity? Modal theories as strong as S4 
take the position that every necessary proposition is necessarily necessary, 
and, indeed, necessarily necessarily necessary, and so on. But if the modal status 
of a proposition is a fact, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason requires an 
explanation for every fact, there must be an explanation of the fact that a propo-
sition is necessary as well as for the fact that it is true. To claim that every 
necessary proposition is necessarily necessary, then, cannot be such an ex-
planation. The view Hasker supports, while a common one, takes the position 
that there is nothing to be said outside of modal structure to explain why it 
is what it is. It is this position that I am challenging. 
Hasker is right that the stronger modal systems are more entrenched, and 
I do not claim that they are demonstrably incoherent. What I do claim is that 
anyone proposing the truth of one of the PEPs is relying on the background 
assumption of a modal system at least as strong as S4. But not only are there 
signs that these modal systems are under attack on technical grounds, I sug-
gest there are metaphysical grounds for questioning them as well. Since 
anyone proposing that a Power Entailment Principle is a universal truth has 
the burden of proving this is the case, these considerations lead to the con-
clusion that PEP has not been demonstrated. 
Hasker's second objection to the first counterexample rests on three prin-
ciples which, he says, partially stipulate the meaning of "necessary proposi-
tion," "essential property," and "possible world," and which he believes to 
be incompatible with my example: 
i) A proposition is necessarily true if and only if it is true in all possible 
worlds. 
ii) A property is essential to an individual if and only if the individual has 
the property in every possible world in which the individual exists. 
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iii) God, God's states, and God's attributes are included in the possible 
worlds rather than outside them. 
These principles are plausible standard modal principles and Hasker is right 
that I use them myself. As stated, however, the principles appear to be non-
committal on the issue of whether there are alternative complete sets of 
possible worlds. If they are interpreted in a way that permits alternative sets 
of worlds, there is no incompatibility between my example and the principles. 
On the other hand, if they are intended to rule out such alternatives, this needs 
to be stated plainly in their formulation and defended. Hasker cannot rely on 
the claim that it is part of the meaning of such terms as 'necessary proposition' 
and 'possible world' that there is a unique set of possible worlds. To make 
such a claim is to say that the weaker modal systems are mistaken about the 
meaning of these terms. Hasker has not made such a claim, and I doubt that 
he intends to do so. 
Rather than to address the issue of alternative sets of worlds, Hasker mis-
represents his own principle on essential properties. As he correctly points 
out, it follows by principle (ii) that the property of decreeing that (11) is true 
is one of God's essential properties. "But," says Hasker, "it's not in God's 
power to shed one of his essential properties any more than it is in my power 
to divest myself of my own essential properties." And so, he says, the example 
fails. The question, though, is not whether God can shed one of his essential 
properties, but whether one of God's essential properties is best explained as 
the result of his choice, a choice which it is true to say he could have made 
differently, even though it is also a choice which God makes in all possible 
worlds-i.e., all worlds possible relative to the actual world. The idea that 
God wills an essential property of his is not without precedent, and if it is 
ruled out it cannot simply be on the basis of principles such as (i)-(iii), much 
less on the basis of a stipulation of the meaning of modal concepts. 
Hasker's final point about my first counterexample is that it will not help 
in the case in which p is contingent. My second counterexample was devised 
in anticipation of this objection. Suppose that A is something I can choose to 
do or not to do, and that God decides to do B in all and only those worlds in 
which I do A. If so, the propositions I do A and God does B would be strictly 
equivalent, and their strict equivalence would be brought about by God, not 
me. In this case, I claimed, I have the power to bring it about that I do A is 
true, and I have the power to bring it about that I do A is false, I do A entails 
God does B and It is not the case that I do A entails It is not the case that 
God does B, yet I do not have the power to bring it about that God does B is 
true. The truth of that proposition is brought about by God. We have, then, a 
counter-example to (PEP 1). 
In reply Hasker claims that in the case described I do bring about the truth 
of God does B, and he thinks that I have misunderstood the sense of "bring 
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about" intended in (PEP 1). He suggests that in my counterexample I make 
the assumption that "bring about" means "consciously and intentionally bring 
about," yet I make no such assumption and agree with Hasker that one can 
bring about something without doing so consciously or intentionally. My reason 
for saying that it is God who brings about the truth of God does B is simply that 
God does all the work of bringing about the truth of that proposition. 
To see why this is so, consider an analogy. Suppose that I decide that when 
and only when Joe apologizes to Mary, I will build my house. Joe apologizes 
to Mary and I build my house. Does Joe bring about the building of my house? 
I control the house-building, both in its timing (I am the one who decided to 
begin when Joe makes the apology), and in carrying out the entire project. 
Joe no more brings about my house building than the moon does if I were to 
decide to wait for a new moon. In the theistic case it is part of God's essence 
that he does B if and only if I do A, and so we are back to the question of 
the relation between God's will and his essence, but in any case it is God, 
whether by his will or his essence, who brings about B, not I. 
My third set of counterexamples proceeded from the assumption that there 
are some true counterfactuals of freedom whose truth is brought about by the 
human agents named in the counterfactuals. As an example I suggested If my 
son asked me for an apple, I would not give him poison (A > - P). The idea 
was to reduce counterfactuals to strict implications based on similarity of 
worlds in roughly the manner discussed by David Lewis. If a counterfactual 
of freedom is brought about by a human agent, its equivalent strict implica-
tion would be brought about by the human agent as well. Since clearly not 
all necessary truths can be brought about by such an agent, we can formulate 
a counterexample to PEPl. 
I now believe that the attempt to reduce counterfactuals to strict implica-
tions will not work, but that is not the objection Hasker gives. Instead, his 
response is to claim that there is a true strict implication of freedom which 
has nothing to do with the agent's power corresponding to every false coun-
terfactual of freedom as well as to every true one. Such a response suggests 
that it was not clear in my book that my proposal was to find a strict impli-
cation equivalent to the counterfactual. But then, Hasker's move is not rele-
vant if only because no necessarily true proposition can be equivalent to a 
false one. 
A better formulation of the intent of the third counterexample is as follows: 
Take the counterfactual of freedom 
(1) A > - P. 
Necessarily, (1) is true in the actual world just in case 
(2) There is at least one AI-P world more similar to the actual world than 
any AlP world. 
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As long as 'the actual world' names the world that is in fact the actual world 
and the similarity relations among worlds are necessary, then (2) is a neces-
sary truth. If it is reasonable to say that since by hypothesis I can bring about 
(1), I can bring about (2), we have a counterexample to PEP! by substituting 
(2) for p and 2+2=4 for q. 
The claim that if I can bring about (1) I can bring about (2) would be 
supported if (1) and (2) are equivalent. However, Edward Wierenga has led 
me to doubt that (1) and (2) are equivalent and that the moral to be drawn is 
that the statement of the truth conditions for some proposition p in the se-
mantics may not be equivalent to p. Still, even in the absence of logical 
equivalence it may nonetheless be the case that if I can bring about the truth 
of a proposition, I can bring about the truth of the proposition expressing its 
truth conditions. But I am now convinced that this will not work either. To 
see why not, consider a simpler example. Suppose I can bring about the truth 
of 
(1) I drink a cup of tea at t. 
(1) is true in the actual world just in case 
(2) Proposition (1) is true in the actual world. 
But I cannot bring about the truth of (2) since I do not have the power to 
make the actual world the actual world. Therefore, the example fails, and I 
withdraw my third counterexample to the PEPs. 
I thank Bill Hasker for his comments and welcome further thoughts from 
him and others on these examples. 
Loyola Marymount University 
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